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When a contractor expends a great deal of time and expense to prepare a 
proposal in response to a high-dollar Government Request for Proposals and 
award of the resultant contract is made to another contractor, the unsuccessful 
offeror will often protest since the post-award debriefing does not satisfy his 
concerns as to why his was not the best offer. This thesis reviews the current 
written guidance pertaining to post-award debriefings, looks at the current 
installation level debriefing process and recommends ways to improve debriefings. 
Results of a questionnaire sent to installation contracting officers and offerors 
who contract with them indicate: the current debriefing process is not working as 
well as it should; the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) should help 
improve the debrief; and further improvements are possible. 
Some of the thesis' recommendations are: make the post-award debrief an 
integral part of the process for key technical personnel; give weaknesses, in 
writing, to the unsuccessful offerors with notification of award; if requested, 
release all information that the contractor would receive under protest discovery 
procedures; provide analytical training for contracting officers; use videos and 
other types of training on "how not to" and "how to" conduct a post-award 
debriefing. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The preparation of a proposal in response to a high-dollar 
Government Request for Proposals (RFP), requires the 
expenditure of a great deal of time and money by contractors 
submitting offers. When award of the resultant contract is 
made on the basis of other than price alone, the unsuccessful 
offerors want to know why they did not receive the award. 
Upon written request, contracting officers are required to 
debrief unsuccessful offerors after a negotiated, competitive 
contract is awarded to another contractor. For guidance prior 
to conducting a debriefing, a contracting officer can seek 
legal advice and review precedent-setting opinions by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the General Services 
Administration Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) resulting 
from unsuccessful offerors' protests of awards decisions to 
those forums. However, the only written guidance on 
conducting a debriefing is one-fourth of a page in the multi- 
volume Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 15.1003) . The FAR 
tells contracting officers more of what they cannot say, than 
what they can or should say. Obviously the contracting 
officer needs more definitive guidance to complete this 
crucial task successfully. 
Contracting officers are fearful of providing too much 
information during the debriefing. They fear that the more 
information they provide, the better chance that they will 
misspeak, violate a regulation or erroneously provide 
proprietary contractor information or procurement sensitive 
Government information, thereby making a protest more likely. 
These psychological filters limit the amount and clarity of 
information provided to the offeror during debriefings. 
On the one hand, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) 
of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) requires contracting officers to 
maintain an open dialogue with industry, to understand the 
capabilities of the marketplace, and to achieve full and open 
competition. On the other hand, numerous complex laws with 
severe penalties require contracting officers to control the 
flow of competitive procurement sensitive information to 
maintain the integrity of the procurement process. This 
second fact frightens contracting agencies and prevents clear 
and open communication with contractors. The Ethics Reform 
Act of 1989 stipulates fines of $100,000, and up to five years 
in prison, for individuals illegally disclosing source 
sensitive information to contractors (Sagan, 1993). 
As a result, these laws have had a chilling effect on the 
flow of information between industry and Government. In order 
for the Government to realize fully the benefits of any 
proposed solutions to providing more guidance to contracting 
officers in conducting the post-award debriefing, we must have 
an open and clear flow of information between the contractor 
and the Government. 
The Competition In Contracting Act states that there are 
two methods for the competitive procurement of Federal goods 
and services: sealed bid and negotiated procurement. The 
first method, sealed bid, is to be used when (a) there is 
adequate time, (b) contract award will be made based on price 
and price related factors, (c) no discussions with offerors 
are needed, and (d) there is an expectation of receiving bids 
from more than one offeror. The second method, competitive 
negotiation, is to be used if the procurement does not meet 
the criteria for sealed bidding. 
Under sealed bid procedures, contract award is made to the 
lowest priced, responsive, responsible bidder. In most cases, 
bid openings are open to the public and an abstract of the 
bids received is available to bidders upon request. Thus, 
unsuccessful bidders generally know immediately that they did 
not win the contract award because they did not have the 
lowest priced bid. 
Under competitive negotiation procedures, contract award 
is most often determined by factors other than price alone. 
There is no public bid opening and there is usually a lengthy 
period of evaluations and negotiations before a contract is 
finally awarded. Since award is not based solely on the 
lowest price, an unsuccessful offeror may not understand why 
his proposal did not result in a contract award. 
Contract award resulting from negotiated procedures is 
based on the best value to the Army, price and other factors 
considered. Among the other factors considered may be 
technical solution, management experience, past performance, 
and risk. Each factor is weighted in accordance with its 
importance to the product or service required. Price is 
evaluated as to reasonableness and becomes the deciding factor 
only when offers are essentially equal, after evaluating the 
other factors. After a contract is awarded, the contracting 
officer notifies the unsuccessful offerors that they were not 
selected for contract award. 
When multiple, weighted selection criteria are used in 
awarding the contract, the unsuccessful offerors have to 
request, in writing, a post-award debriefing from the 
contracting officer to find out why they did not receive the 
contract award. The reason may no longer be simply that his 
price was too high, but usually his technical solution, 
management experience or some other factor or combination of 
factors, were not rated as highly, in accordance with the 
evaluation criteria, as were the awardee's. Only when an 
unsuccessful offeror requests a debriefing from the 
contracting officer can he find out the reasons for not being 
selected for contract award. 
In preparation for the debriefing, a contracting officer 
will seek legal advice from the Government attorney/advisor. 
Often, the attorney will advise the contracting officer to 
"err on the side of safety, " and not disclose too much 
specific information. This caution often leads to protests, 
because the attorney normally recommends against giving the 
unsuccessful offeror the information he needs and wants. The 
areas of interest most often include: evaluation factors, 
clarification of specifications, transition/ conversion plans, 
and contingency plans (Shipley, 1994) . 
Industry contractors will protest for several reasons. 
George Shipley, Vice President for Military Systems at 
Electronic Data Services (EDS), believes there are two 
underlying reasons for filing protests, (1) to gain the 
contract or (2) to correct a perceived inequity in the 
evaluation. He also feels that perceived inequities usually 
result from poor communication at the post-award debriefing. 
"In many cases we discover that what we perceived as an unfair 
practice was in fact good business poorly communicated." 
(Shipley, 1994) . 
The "Quarterly Bid Protest Analysis Reports" for 1992 and 
1993, compiled by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (SARDA), 
confirm Shipley's opinions. The 1992 report shows contractors 
initiated 571 protests. Of the 571, 104 protests were based 
on the belief that the evaluation factors were unfair or that 
the evaluation of the proposals was unfair. That was the 
single greatest cause for protests in 1992. The trend 
continued into the first quarter of 1993 when 45 of 206 
protests were for the same reason. Additionally, problems with 
specification issues ran a close second as the basis for 
protests, 61 in 1992 and 30 in first quarter 1993 (Davis, 1992 
& Schneider, 1993) . 
The contracting office's tendency to stratify the 
communication between potential contractors and the Government 
is in response to a fear of protests. This fear of protests 
drives contracting offices to keep communications very formal. 
However, the contracting effort should be a team effort, 
fostering a win/win attitude. Without open communications, or 
at the very least flexible and responsive communications, an 
air of mistrust permeates the contracting process. This leads 
to excessive protests by losing contractors. By communicating 
more effectively and openly, these problems could be defused 
by making certain that every unsuccessful contractor knows how 
its proposal was evaluated. 
Further, the process must ensure that every contractor 
knows why its proposal was not accepted. Currently, the 
contractor is just sent a form letter after initial 
evaluations if its proposal is not considered competitive. 
Once that letter is received, contractors are allowed to 
respond by letter, and at no time prior to the award of a 
contract are offerors who do not make the competitive range 
debriefed as to why they were not considered for contract 
award. 
If communications were better and more meaningful, the 
Government would ultimately get better products and 
contractors would get the feedback they need to prepare more 
competitive proposals in the future. 
Better communication would cause a drop in the number of 
awards protested each year, saving the Government countless 
manhours and dollars spent to prepare and defend its position 
during a lengthy, unnecessary protest appeal process. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the problematic 
issues surrounding the post-award debriefing of unsuccessful 
offerors at the installation contracting office level and 
determine what guidance can be provided to contracting 
officers in order to improve the debriefing. 
C. TEE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions will be answered by the 
thesis. 
Primary: What are the systemic problems and issues 
associated with the Army installation contracting offices' 
debriefing of unsuccessful offerors and what guidance can be 
provided to the contracting officer in order to improve the 
debriefing? 
Subsidiary: 
1. What are the current regulations, statutes, GAO 
decisions, and other guidance pertaining to the debriefing of 
unsuccessful offerors? 
2. What are the current requirements for debriefing 
unsuccessful offerors and how are the Army's installation 
contracting offices conducting the debriefings? 
3. What are the problems associated with the debriefing 
process  from  the  installation  contracting  offices' 
perspective? 
4. What are the problems associated with the debriefing 
process from the contractor's perspective? 
5. What guidance can be provided to the contracting 
officer in order to improve the debriefing of unsuccessful 
offerors? 
D.  SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
l. Scope: This thesis focuses on the debriefing of 
unsuccessful offerors at the installation contracting office 
level. It covers all contracts awarded on a basis of other 
than price alone. The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installations are 
considered in this analysis since they comprise the majority 
of the Army installations. Questionnaires and interviews on 
the current process and how to improve it are directed to 
FORSCOM  and  TRADOC  contracting  officials  and  defense 
contractor representatives who contract with them. 
2. Limitations:  The following limitations exist in the- 
thesis . 
a. The FAR has not been amended to implement the 
provisions of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
of 1994. Until the FAR is amended, the extent of the guidance 
required by the Act to be provided on debriefing unsuccessful 
offerors is not known. 
b. Not all contracting officers within FORSCOM and 
TRADOC and the defense contractors who work with them could be 
contacted. Therefore, information may exist that would have 
been useful for this thesis, but was not collected, and 
therefore not analyzed. 
3. Assumptions:  The following assumptions were made in 
this thesis. 
a. The reader of the thesis has a general 
understanding of Government contract management. 
b. Current regulations concerning debriefing of 
unsuccessful offerors will remain in effect. 
c. The provisions of the FASA will be fully 
implemented in the FAR. 
E.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
In his June 1994 thesis entitled "Briefing Unsuccessful 
Offerors - An Updated Approach," Captain Curtis H. Nutbrown, 
U.S. Army, researched and analyzed this issue from the systems 
acquisition perspective. His questionnaires were addressed to 
U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) contracting officers and to 
contractors who developed and produced major systems for AMC 
and AMC's major subcommands. His thesis was completed prior 
to enactment of the FASA and covered the more formal source 
selection process for major systems. 
This thesis will address installation level contracting 
which is less formal and less structured. It will also 
address FASA and its affect on the debriefing process. 
Questionnaires were sent to FORSCOM and TRADOC contracting 
officers and contractors who provide services to them. These 
two commands are headquarters for the majority of the Army's 
installations and are not a part of AMC. 
F.  DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1. AFARS: Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
2. AMC:  U.S. Army Materiel Command 
3. CICA:  Competition in Contracting Act 
4. CECOM: U.S. Army Communications and Electronics 
Command 
5. DFARS:  Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement 
6. DAWIA: Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
7. FAR:  Federal Acquisition Regulation 
8. FASA:  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
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9. FOIA:  Freedom of Information Act 
10. FORSCOM:  U.S. Army Forces Command 
11. GAO:  General Accounting Office 
12. LRIP:  Low Rate Initial Production 
13. MACOM:  Major Command 
14. PARC:  Principal Assistant Responsible for 
Contracting 
15. RFP:  Request for Proposals 
16. SARDA: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Research, Development and Acquisition 
17. SBA:  Small Business Administration 
18. SSA:  Source Selection Authority 
19. SSAC: Source Selection Advisory Council 
20. SSEB: Source Selection Evaluation Board 
21. SSP:  Source Selection Plan 
22. TRADOC:  U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
23. U.S.C.:  United States Code 
6.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II (Literature Review and Background) describes 
the function of contracting officers within the FORSCOM and 
TRADOC organizations; addresses the laws, regulations and 
other guidance pertaining to debriefings; discusses how 
debriefings fit into the source selection process; and lists 
the reasons for conducting debriefings. 
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Chapter III (Methodology) describes the rationale behind 
the questionnaires and discusses the interviews. 
Chapter IV (Presentation and Analysis of Data) summarizes 
and analyzes the questionnaire responses and data collected 
from the interviews. 
Chapter V (Conclusions and Recommendations) discusses the 
conclusions made from the data collected and makes 
recommendations for improving the current debriefing process. 
This chapter also recommends areas for further study. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
A.  GENERAL 
This chapter will discuss the laws, regulations and other 
guidance pertaining to debriefings, how debriefings assist the 
source selection process, the reasons for conducting 
debriefings and the function of contracting officers within 
the FORSCOM and TRADOC organizations. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) recognizes the need 
for open dialogue between the Government and contractors. The 
GAO has stated that: 
Another legitimate pre-procurement agency action is 
discussing requirements with potential suppliers .... 
Such discussions are clearly necessary for an agency 
in the conduct of ordinary business .... It would be 
unwise and unrealistic to limit discussions prior to 
ascertaining what the government requires .... An 
agency cannot intelligently define its needs in a 
vacuum. In a number of cases, we have criticized the 
action of agencies which improperly limited 
competition because no discussions of requirements 
were held with potential suppliers, but rather the 
only firms solicited made products with which agency 
personnel were familiar. Maremont Corporation, Comp. 
Gen. Dec. B-180276 (Aug. 20, 1976), 76-2 CPD Paragraph 
181. 
Both the Government and industry benefit from open 
dialogue which will help avoid problems during the entire 
procurement process. Government personnel can write 
statements of work that clearly prescribe the Government's 
needs and broaden the field of competition.  Industry can 
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better  direct  their  scarce  resources  to  satisfy  the 
Government's needs. 
B.  LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON DEBRIEFING 
1.  Laws 
In addition to the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) 
discussed in Chapter I, there are other laws which provide 
ample authority for release of information to industry. 
Examples of such laws are the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 634) 
and the Procurement Integrity Act. 
Nevertheless, Government personnel exhibit a great deal of 
uncertainty about what they can or cannot discuss with 
industry during post-award debriefing. 
The most recent attempt to fulfill the requirement for 
providing the contractor with more meaningful information is 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. In 
Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1991, Congress directed the Department of Defense 
to appoint an advisory panel of Government and private-sector 
experts to review all laws affecting DOD procurement, with a 
view toward streamlining the acquisition process. (Vincent, 
1993). FASA results from the work of the Section 800 Panel 
and implements many of the Panel's recommendations regarding 
the overhaul of DOD's acquisition laws. The Act requires that 
unsuccessful offerors be notified within three days after 
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contract award, and debriefed within five days after receipt 
of a written request for debriefing. To activate the five-day 
debriefing requirement, an unsuccessful offeror must make its 
request within three days of receiving notice of award. At a 
minimum, the debriefing must contain basic information about 
the award decision, such as: the unsuccessful offeror's 
significant weak or deficient factors; the awardee's and the 
unsuccessful offeror's overall cost and technical rating; the 
overall ranking of all offerors; a summary of rationale for 
award; the make and model of any commercial item, if the 
awardee's proposal includes a commercial item which is an end 
item under the contract; and reasonable responses to the 
unsuccessful offeror's questions regarding whether the agency 
followed applicable laws, regulations and procedures. Still 
the debriefing should not include a point-by-point comparison 
of the proposals, nor any information exempt from release 
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (Carney, 1994). 
In addition, if, as a result of a successful protest or 
otherwise, an agency issues a new solicitation or seeks to 
make an award as a result of best and final offers under the 
original solicitation, within one year after original award, 
information provided in any prior debriefing shall be provided 
to all offerors.  (Carney, 1994 and Lumer, 1994). 
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2.  Regulations 
Currently, the FAR states, in very general terms, what you 
cannot discuss with a contractor. Nowhere does the FAR 
provide any guidance on what you can or should discuss. This 
leads to a severely restricted flow of information. 
The FAR, Part 15, Sub-part 10, Section 3, is short, 
nonspecific in nature and reads as follows: 
15.1003 Debriefing of Unsuccessful Offerors. 
(a) When a contract is awarded on the basis of 
other than price alone, unsuccessful offerors, 
upon their written request, shall be debriefed as 
soon as possible and furnished the basis for the 
selection decision and contract award. 
(b) Debriefing information shall include the 
Government's evaluation of the significant weak 
or deficient factors in the proposal; however, 
point-by-point comparisons with other offerors' 
proposals shall not be made. Debriefing shall not 
reveal the relative merits or technical standing 
of competitors or the evaluation scoring. 
Moreover, debriefing shall not reveal any 
information that is not releasable under the 
Freedom of Information Act, for example: 
(1) Trade Secrets. 
(2) Privileged or confidential manufacturing 
processes and techniques. 
(3) Commercial and financial information that 
is privileged or confidential, including cost 
breakdowns, profit, indirect cost rates and 
similar information. 
(c) The contracting officer shall include a 
summary of the debriefing in the contract file. 
(FAR 15.1003). 
The FAR does not mandate a debriefing and only requires 
one upon the written request of an unsuccessful offeror. The 
Government usually receives written requests for debriefings 
shortly after contract award. 
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C.  THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS AND DEBRIEFING UNSUCCESSFUL 
OFFERORS 
The first thing that must happen to start the defense 
acquisition process, is the "Determination of Need." Once a 
user recognizes a need, the process has begun. Meaningful 
communication during each phase of the process is essential to 
avoid the communications bottleneck at the post-award 
debriefing. 
The defense acquisition process is a series of milestones 
and phases, arranged in chronological order, known as the 
"Life-Cycle Process Model." Contracts may be awarded during 
any of the phases of the process for the various requirements 
contained in that phase. While most installation level 
acquisitions do not usually involve all these formal phases, 
they do employ a scaled-down version of the process. 
Therefore, the concept of where the post-award debriefing fits 
in the source selection process is essentially the same. 
Formal selection procedures are used for contracts such as 
major systems procurements and by installation contracting 
officers in the large commercial activities procurements 
solicited in accordance with the requirements of Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. Although not all 
of the milestones and phases will apply to the majority of 
installation contracts, a brief outline of the formal process 
will help to explain the complexity of Government 
acquisitions. 
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Milestone 0 authorizes entry into Phase 0, Concept 
Exploration and Definition. In Phase 0, studies of alternate 
concepts are conducted. These studies may be conducted in- 
house by Government personnel or may be contracted out to 
private industry. 
During Milestone 1, Concept Demonstration Approval, the 
initiation of a new program, and entry into Phase 1, 
Demonstration and Validation, are approved. 
Milestone 2, Development Approval, is the approval of 
entry into Engineering and Manufacturing Development, Phase 2. 
Milestone 3, Production Approval, is the approval for 
entry into Phase 3, Production and Deployment. 
Phase 4, Operations and Support, covers the system's use 
by fielded units. The contracting agency continues support and 
monitoring to ensure that the user's needs are being met. 
In Milestone 4, Major Modification Approval, the 
Government determines if a system still in production warrants 
major modifications. This milestone is scheduled during Phase 
3 or Phase 4, as required.   (DSMC,1993). 
Most installation equipment contracts fall into Phase 4 
type requirements. Formal source selection for award of 
contracts during any of the acquisition phases involves a 
Source Selection Plan (SSP), Source Selection Evaluation Board 
(SSEB), Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC), and a Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) . The SSP specifies who the SSA will 
be, who will serve on the SSAC and SSEB, and what the 
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evaluation criteria will be for the evaluation and selection 
of the contract awardee. 
The FAR states that when a contract is awarded on a basis 
of other than price alone, unsuccessful offerors, upon their 
written request, shall be debriefed as soon as possible and 
furnished the basis for the selection decision and contract 
award. (FAR 15.1003) . There is no dollar limitation involved 
in determining when a debriefing is required. In the case of 
less complicated, lower-priced solicitations, the contracting 
officer will be the SSA and a single technical representative 
may perform the duties of both the SSEB and the SSAC. 
Unfortunately, the debriefing is the end of the source 
selection process for the unsuccessful offeror unless he 
decides to protest the award. An unsuccessful offeror 
probably spent as much time and money on his proposal as did 
the awardee. Therefore, if he does not understand why his 
proposal did not win the contract award, he may be reluctant 
to expend that much time and effort on future proposals. A 
well-structured debriefing clearly identifies his strong 
points and his weak areas. With this information, the 
unsuccessful offeror will be in a better position to submit a 
more competitive proposal on future requirements. By helping 
to improve the unsuccessful offeror's competitive position, 
the contracting officer also helps to ensure that more 
competitive proposals are received for future requirements. 
The debriefing should assure the unsuccessful offeror that 
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his proposal was evaluated fairly in accordance with the 
evaluation criteria specified in the solicitation. By 
receiving a step-by-step explanation of the evaluated results 
for each evaluation factor and major subfactor relative to his 
proposal, the unsuccessful offeror will see that the 
evaluation committee evaluated each area of his proposal in 
accordance with the criteria set forth in the solicitation. 
Last, but not least, a comprehensive, informative 
debriefing can help prevent the filing of an unnecessary 
protest by unsuccessful offerors for the sole purpose of 
obtaining additional information on the evaluation process or 
to correct a perceived inequity in the process. 
D.  FORSCOM  AND  TRADOC  CONTRACTING  OFFICERS  IN  THEIR 
ORGANIZATION 
Both FORSCOM and TRADOC have Principal Assistants 
Responsible for Contracting (PARCs) at the major command 
(MACOM) or headquarters level. The PARC reports to a general 
officer who is equivalent to the rank of most installation 
commanders, and thus has a direct link to the MACOM commander. 
In FORSCOM, the PARC reports to the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics. In TRADOC, the PARC reports to the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Base Operations. The PARC is responsible for 
establishing MACOM contracting policy, guidance and oversight, 
ensuring that contracting officers meet the requirements of 
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and 
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for the appointment of contracting officers within the 
installation's Directorates of Contracting. 
Both commands have one central contracting office that 
consolidates some contracts for the installations and often 
handles larger, more complex solicitations where the expertise 
may be lacking at the installation level. Except for these 
two central contracting offices, the Directors of Contracting 
and the other contracting officers are selected at the 
installation level. Selecting officials are encouraged to 
coordinate their choice for any position requiring a 
contracting officer's warrant with the PARC prior to final 
selection to ensure that the individual can be warranted. 
There has been at least one instance in TRADOC where the 
individual selected for the position of Director of 
Contracting was not coordinated with the PARC. The individual 
did not meet the requirements and served for eight months 
without a warrant before resigning. 
Installation contracting officers are in positions that 
require them to be responsive both to the installation 
commander and to the MACOM PARC. The installation Directors 
of Contracting report to and have their performance appraised 
by the installation Chief of Staff. However, they must meet 
the DAWIA and any other MACOM requirements to receive and 
maintain a contracting officer's warrant.  The installation 
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commander may be personally pleased with the performance of 
his Director of Contracting and other contracting officers. 
However, if the performance of anyone of these officials is 
not in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and other 
requirements, the PARC may rescind the requisite warrant and 
the contracting officer will not be able to perform his/her 
duties. Thus, the installation contracting officer must 
please both the installation commander and the MACOM PARC. 
E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter identified and discussed the laws and 
regulations pertaining to debriefing unsuccessful offerors; 
the complexity of the source selection process; the benefits 
of clear and open dialogue between the Government and 
potential contractors from requirements identification up to, 
and including, the post-award debriefings,- and how contracting 
officers fit into the FORSCOM and TRADOC organizations. An 
understanding of these topics will provide the reader a better 
comprehension of debriefing procedures and how they can and 
should be improved. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
A.  GENERAL 
Information for this thesis was collected through a 
literature review, a questionnaire to FORSCOM and TRADOC 
Directorates of Contracting, a questionnaire to contractors 
who do business with these two commands and personal 
interviews. The researcher's knowledge of installation 
contracting, as a result of having served as an installation 
Director of Contracting and as a member of Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, Procurement Management Review Team, 
was also used in analyzing the information gathered and 
forming the conclusions and recommendations. The literature 
search was accomplished first to determine the present written 
guidance available to contracting officers concerning the 
debriefing of unsuccessful offerors. The main audience for 
the questionnaire was the contracting officers who are the 
focal point for the post-award debriefing. It was designed to 
solicit their opinions of the current debriefing process, the 
problems encountered and their suggestions for improving the 
process. One questionnaire was addressed to ten contracting 
offices each in FORSCOM and TRADOC. There are approximately 
17 Directorates of Contracting in each command.  The term 
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"approximately" is used because some of the installations are 
in the process of closing as a result of Base Realignment and 
Closing (BRAC) procedures. None of the installations queried 
are on the BRAC closure list. The other questionnaire was 
addressed to 13 contractors who do business with these two 
commands to obtain the viewpoint of the receiver of the 
debriefing. The two questionnaires covered the same material 
except for one question each. Finally, personal interviews 
with two SARDA staff officers who are in charge of performing 
the Army's Procurement Management Reviews of the installation 
DOCs were conducted to obtain a Headquarters, Department of 
the Army perspective. 
B.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature research included the FAR, DFARS, AFARS and 
other applicable written guidance. It also included synopses 
of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. 
No other major publications on debriefing were found as a 
result of this search. The literature research revealed that 
there is very little written guidance available to FORSCOM and 
TRADOC installation contracting offices concerning the 
debriefing of unsuccessful offerors. In most cases, the 
guidance contained in the FAR is all that is available. The 
DFARS and AFARS do not supplement that guidance in any way. 
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This fact was used in developing the questionnaires and 
personal interview questions. It was discovered that one of 
the U.S. Army Materiel Command's (AMC) major subcommands, the 
U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM), has 
written guidance concerning debriefings; and AMC recently 
published a debriefing handbook and produced a film promoting 
the use of the handbook. Usually, neither of these AMC 
documents, nor the film are made available outside the command 
unless a specific request is made. 
C.  THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
1. General 
The two questionnaires are included as an appendix to 
this thesis. One questionnaire was addressed to FORSCOM and 
TRADOC Directorates of Contracting and the other one to 
contractors who do business with them. 
2. Target Audience 
a. FORSCOM and TRADOC Directorates of Contracting 
The target audience for the FORSCOM and TRADOC 
contracting officer questionnaire was installation level 
contracting officials who conduct debriefings of unsuccessful 
offerors. Questionnaires were sent to 20 Directorates of 
Contracting.  Seventeen responses were received. 
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b.     FORSCOM and TRADOC Contractors 
The target audience for the contractors' questionnaire 
was the top ten contractors (by dollar amounts) who have 
contracts with each command. The companies were selected from 
the Headquarters, Department of the Army, data base. 
Questionnaires were sent to the director of Federal 
contracts of 13 contractors since some companies were 
duplicated on the two lists and some were public utilities 
companies. Five responses were received with only four 
completing the questionnaire. Since the responses provided 
basically the same opinions expressed by the contractors who 
responded to the questionnaire on the previous thesis 
referenced in Chapter I, Paragraph E, no attempt was made to 
obtain further responses. 
3.  Questionnaire Design 
The two questionnaires were designed to solicit the 
opinion of the respondents concerning the installation level 
debriefing process. The content of the questions on both 
questionnaires was the same except for one question on each. 
The one question that was different on the contracting 
officers' questionnaire refers to the availability of local 
instructions for debriefing unsuccessful offerors. The 
question that was different on the contractors' questionnaire 
refers to the top three questions usually asked during a 
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debriefing. The only difference in the other questions were 
the terms used to refer to the respondent, e.g. "I" for the 
Contracting Officers and "the Army" for the contractors. Most 
of the questions were multiple choice or fill in the blank. 
Some questions required written opinions or statements. 
D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the methodology used in researching 
information for the thesis which includes a literature review, 
questionnaires and interviews. This chapter also identified 
the target audience and questionnaire design. Chapter IV will 




IV.  PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OP DATA 
A. GENERAL 
This chapter first presents the data collected and the 
analyses of the answers provided by the respondents to the 
questionnaires. Next, the interview comments are presented 
with an analysis of the comments, followed by a final summary 
of the data analysis. 
B. THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
Except for question 13 on each, the questions are the same 
on both questionnaires; only references such as "I" for 
contracting officers and "the Army" for contractors 
distinguish the question for each audience. Therefore the 
questions are paraphrased and discussed in the order that they 
appear on each of the questionnaires. The answers are 
presented and analyzed with the question to which they apply. 
Contracting officer responses are shown in " () " and contractor 
responses are shown in " [] ". Both questionnaires are found in 
the Appendix in full text. 
Question No. 1. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) requires the Government to debrief unsuccessful 
offerors within five days after receipt of written request. 
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Currently, debriefings are held within  calendar days of 
written request. 
a. 0-10 (11)  [2] 
b. 11-20        (4)   [1] 
c. more than 20   (1)   [1] 
One contracting officer circled all three responses with a 
note "vary, depending on complexity of solicitation and number 
of offerors requesting a debriefing." 
Analysis: Currently, most installation level post-award 
debriefings are conducted within ten days. This is within the 
time period allowed for unsuccessful offerors to file a 
protest if they are not satisfied with the information 
presented during the debriefing. The FASA requirement of 
within five days will improve the time period. 
Question No. 2. Debriefings should be conducted within  
calendar days after written request. 
3     (1)  [1] 5.  (3)  [3] 
lfi    (8) I!  (1) 
Blank  (3) AgAP  (1) 
Analysis: Three contractors feel that debriefings should be 
held within the five day requirement of FASA while one feels 
they should be held within three days. Most of the 
contracting officers indicate that within ten days would be 
more appropriate. The FASA five day requirement will put more 
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pressure on the contracting officer to debrief the 
unsuccessful offeror promptly. 
Question No. 3. FASA requires that agencies provide reasonable 
responses to unsuccessful offeror's questions regarding 
whether the agency followed applicable laws, regulations and 
procedures in soliciting, evaluating and awarding the 
contract.  Currently, contracting officers: 
a. do not allow questions (1)  [2] 
b. allow and answer all questions    (6) 
c. allow and answer some questions   (9)  [2] 
One contracting officer added a "d" and stated "adhere 
strictly to applicable laws, regulations and procedures and 
answer any questions«" Several others who marked "b" or "c" 
also included references such as "within regulations." 
Analysis: Only one contracting officer and two contractors 
indicate that no questions are allowed. Most of the 
contracting officers feel that they answer questions if they 
can do so within regulatory guidance. 
Question No 4.  If some questions are not answered by the 
Contracting Officer, it is because . 
a. They cannot answer them due to regulations or 
confidential/proprietary business information 
(14) 
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b. They will not answer them due to a possible 
protest    [3] 
c. Other  (2)  [1] 
One contractor indicated "b & c" with a note in "c": "The Army 
is careful and conservative in their responses." Another 
contractor left this question blank, but checked "a" in 
question 3 indicating that contracting officers do not allow 
questions. 
Analysis: It is interesting to note that no contracting 
officer indicates that he/she will not answer questions for 
fear of a protest, but three contractors do indicate that as 
a reason. The majority of contracting officers indicate that 
if they do not answer questions, it is because they cannot due 
to regulations. However, several contracting officers mention 
protests in the written answers to some of the following 
questions. This indicates that protests do play a part in the 
contracting officer's thought process during the debriefing. 
Question No. 5. Debriefings normally consist of . 
a. limited information, because  
[4] 
b. as much information as Contracting Officers can 
give in accordance with the regulations and 
confidential/proprietary business information 
(16) 
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Three of the contractors selected "a" and completed the 
question:   "of fear of protest and regs"; "of concern of 
giving debriefing team too much information, and worried of 
criticism from upper management"; and "? but getting better." 
The fourth circled "a", but left the insert blank. 
One contracting officer indicated "a and b" with the comment: 
"depends on personality and attitude of the SSEB Chairman, 
quality of eval and board members, level of contracting 
officer involvement in process." 
Analysis:  There is a definite disconnect here.  All four 
contractors feel that information presented during the 
debriefing is limited. Most of the contracting officers feel 
that they present as much information as possible within 
regulation. 
Question No. 6. FASA requires that debriefings address the 
unsuccessful offeror's significant weak or deficient factors. 
Currently, debriefings clearly identify weaknesses in the 
unsuccessful offeror's proposal . 
a. always    (15)  [1] 
b. sometimes   (2)  [3] 
c. never 
Analysis: Most contracting officers feel that the debriefing 
addresses the offeror's significant weak or deficient factors 
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while all but one contractor feel that these factors are only 
sometimes addressed. 
Question No. 7. Contracting Officers debrief unsuccessful 
offerors on the merits of their proposal.  (Indicate all 
that apply). 
a. technical   (17)  [4] 
b. management  (17)  [4] 
c. cost       (17)  [4] 
Analysis: There is total agreement here that the debriefing 
covers the technical, management and cost merits of 
unsuccessful offerors' proposals. 
Question No. 8. Unsuccessful Offerors are normally satisfied 
with the debriefing on the technical, management, and cost 
elements of their proposal . 
a. always    (5) 
b. sometimes  (12)  [3] 
c. never [1] 
Analysis: Almost everyone agrees that unsuccessful offerors 
are only sometimes satisfied with the post-award debrief. 
Question No. 9. Debriefings are to unsuccessful offerors 
in that upon conclusion of a debriefing, they completely 
understand why they did not win the contract award, and 
debriefings give them information that leads to more 
competitive proposals in future competition. 
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a. valuable (8)  [1] 
b. somewhat valuable   (9)  [3] 
c. not at all valuable 
Analysis: Everyone agreed that debriefings are at least 
somewhat valuable to the unsuccessful offeror. However, since 
only eight contracting officers and one contractor feel they 
are valuable, there is definitely room for improvement. 
Question No. 10. Debrief ings should address (indicate all 
that apply), as long as confidential business information is 
not disclosed. 
a. the basic proposed technical solution of the 
awardee  (1) 
b. the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and 
debriefed offeror 
c. cost or price associated with the major components 
of the awardee's proposal 
d. overall ranking and total evaluation scores of the 
awardee and debriefed offeror 
e. technical point scores of the awardee and 
debriefed offeror 
f. all of the above  (6)  [2] 
g. other (specify)   (6) 
In addition to the above, one contracting officer indicated "a 
through g" with the comment in "g":  "proposed management 
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solution," one indicated "b,c and e, " one indicated "a,b,d,and 
e," and one indicated "a through c." Those completing "g" 
made statements such as "strengths and weaknesses of debriefed 
offeror's proposal only." One contractor indicated "a through 
d," and one indicated "f and g" with the comment "evaluated 
and proposed price of all offerors." 
Analysis: There seems to be no agreement among contracting 
officers and among contractors as to what should be covered in 
the post-award debrief. Since FASA specifies more of what can 
be covered in the debrief, this may have been cleared up 
somewhat, but not totally. 
Question No 11. List three strengths of the Army debriefing 
process. 
Representative contracting officer responses include: 
-Debriefings are timely after request by offeror 
-Preparations for the debriefing are thorough 
-Offeror is provided strengths and weaknesses of proposal 
-Offeror has more understanding as to why he is not the 
awardee 
-Provides opportunity to respond to relevant offeror 
questions (even though we may not be able to answer them 
all) 
-Enables them to prepare better for future proposals and 
to become more competitive next time 
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-Thoroughness 
-Offeror has more understanding of the evaluation process 
-Supports the Government rationale for award 
-Contracting and technical personnel are present in face- 
to-face debriefing 
-Anyone who submits a proposal is entitled to a debriefing 
-Not required unless requested by offeror 
-Not required to reveal relative merits of competitors or 
evaluation scoring 
-Strengthens industrial base for future requirements 
-Face-to-face discussions often defuse protests or 
disputes 




-More detail is provided 
-More open discussion 
-Command support for debriefing process 
-Honest debriefings 
-Willingness to do it right 
Analysis: Based on respondents' comments, currently the post- 
award debrief is at least relatively timely.   Some good 
feedback is being provided to the unsuccessful offeror by 
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contracting officers. The comments by the contractors are a 
bit more cautious with an indication that contracting officers 
are willing to do it right and that there is more command 
support for the debriefing process. This could indicate that 
unsuccessful offerors blame the process rather than the 
contracting officer for any short-comings in the debriefing. 
Question No. 12. List three weaknesses of the Army debriefing 
process. 
Contracting officer responses include: 
-Tendency to be too vague; fear of sharing information 
resulting in debriefer providing inadequate information 
-Time consuming; the new timeframes outlined by FASA may 
prove burdensome 
-Usually extremely difficult to re-gather team for 
debriefing 
-Discovery process now available under GAO protest 
-Offerors sometimes do not understand that some questions 
cannot be answered because of confidential information 
-Offerors many times want only confidential/proprietary 
information 
-Lack of debriefer's familiarity with the proposal and 
evaluation 
-More detailed guidance needed for the contracting officer 
and debrief team 
38 
-Appears FASA will make debrief more burdensome to the 
Government 
-Criteria for conducting debrief should be more stringent 
-Step-by-step procedures and recommended list of attendees 
have not been developed 
-Feedback sometimes generic; inability to be specific in 
some areas 
-Failure to win award does not equate to significant 
deficiencies when award based on best value, makes 
debriefing more difficult 
-Inconsistent; too much variation from command to command 
-Weak formal source selection structure; unsubstantiated 
technical scores of proposals 
-Not being able to alleviate a possible protest by 
thoroughly satisfying and explaining the weakness of the 
unsuccessful offer 
-Protests are too cheap; costly delays result from 
frivolous protests 
-The contracting officer is always wrong until he proves 
his innocence to everyone 
-Too "risk" averse 
-Too structured and formal 
Contractor responses include: 
-Failure to compare offers 
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-Need more information 
-Needs to be formalized 
-Use definable terms not just terms like "good" 
-Lack of clarification/answers somewhat vague 
-Concern as to the information transferred 
-Timeliness 
-Tell you what you want to hear 
-Do not articulate in detail why you lost 
-No true insight 
Analysis: The research shows that the post-award debriefing 
process is time consuming; usually does not provide all the 
information unsuccessful offerors want; there is a lack of 
debriefer (usually the contracting officer) familiarity with 
the proposal and evaluation of the unsuccessful offeror; 
technical support is often lacking after contract award when 
evaluation teams have been disbanded; more guidance is needed 
for the contracting officer and the debriefing team,- and time 
consuming protests are still likely. Contractors get no true 
insight from the post-award debriefing process as to why 
theirs was not a winning proposal. There is no standard 
debriefing format, there is variation from command to command, 
and even variation from contracting officer to contracting 
officer at the same installation. 
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Question No 13. (Contracting officers) My organization has 
internal instructions covering debriefing procedures. 
a. yes  (5) 
b. no   (11) 
One left this question blank, and one who indicated "b" 
stated:  "being developed." 
Analysis: Few installations have internal supplemental 
instructions. The FAR is the only written guidance readily 
available to contracting officers for guidance in conducting 
the post-award debriefing of unsuccessful offerors. 
Question No 13. (Contractors) The three most common questions 
I ask during a debriefing are: 
-What are winning price & eval price & winner? 
-What is audited price of my offer? 
-What are evaluated and proposed price of other offers? 
-How you ranked re: point totals? 
-Were we in the competitive range? 
-Why did we lose? 
-What can we do to improve? 
-Was the process fair to all offerors? 
« 
-How did we compare to winner? (never get it) 
-What are the rankings? 
Analysis:   Contractors ask probing questions during the 
debriefing, but they usually want more information than is 
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presented. When they do not get the answers they are seeking, 
they will protest to obtain additional information. 
Question No 14. The Army could improve the debriefing process 
by: 
Contracting officer responses include: 
-Being able to show scores/rankings of all offerors at 
debriefing 
-Providing relevant information, becoming more familiar 
with our acquisitions, thoroughly discussing strengths 
and weaknesses of proposal 
-Making a protest cost more than a stamp 
-Providing more guidance to prepare for formal debrief; 
Laundry list of do and don't; Information to discuss, not 
discuss 
-Impose the debrief requirements based on point and price 
disparity 
-Allowing more detailed discussion of specific scores 
-Based on our experience the correct process works very 
well.  After award, the errors, omissions and 
clarifications (EOCs) used during discussions prior to 
best and final offers, are used to develop a written 
narrative of weaknesses in proposals.  This written 
document is then provided to the unsuccessful offerors. 
Offerors are then instructed to notify the contracting 
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officer if they desire an oral debriefing.  Our 
experience has been that offerors are generally satisfied 
with the written debrief and do not request an oral 
debrief. 
-Improving and support of source selection process 
-Being timely, be able to articulate the Government's 
source selection position while maintaining a calm 
atmosphere with the contractor 
-Providing training to contracting officers so that 
debriefing is consistent between installations and 
commands, or even contracting officers at the 
installation 
-Honesty and forthrightness - full disclosure except for 
proprietary 
Contractor responses include: 
-Comparing offers 
-Providing information to extent regulations allow 
-Open and honest communication, ensuring the bidding was 
fair, ensuring RFP requirements and especially a clear 
evaluation plan prior to issuance of RFP 
-More detail and comparative rankings 
Analysis:  To avoid unnecessary protests, the contracting 
officer needs to provide more detail to the unsuccessful 
offeror during the debriefing.  Contracting officers need 
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training and guidance in order to be more familiar with what 
they are debriefing; and to make debriefings more consistent 
or standard. Since protests are easy to file and are time 
consuming, more open and honest communication is required. 
Question No. 15. Unsuccessful offerors could improve the 
debriefing process by. 
Contracting officer responses include: 
-Accepting the fact that there can only be one award, 
unless set-aside for multiple award 
-Giving more thought and requests for details when we 
afford them the opportunity to provide us with questions 
that they want answered at the debriefing 
-Understanding what information may be provided at 
debriefing 
-Attending them for the purpose of gaining useful "lessons 
learned" information that can provide beneficial 
information for future requirements rather than trying to 
identify information that may allow them to protest 
-Asking the right questions 
-Specifying the area of proposal for debrief. Be prepared 
with detailed questions.  Be receptive to Government 
response; not argumentative 
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-Request only written debriefs unless there is some 
extenuating circumstance which would make a verbal 
debrief more advantageous 
-Not protesting first, allowing/requesting a debriefing 
before protesting,- by listening and learning from the 
information provided 
-Identify areas in the process they would like to see 
changed 
-Keep the lawyers home 
-Understanding the evaluation criteria better and really 
make sure they understand the basis of award in Section 
M of the solicitation before submitting their proposal 
-Coming to learn how to improve. Most come as an injured 
party wanting to have their unsuccessful offer 
reconsidered 
-Believing what they are told, trusting the debriefer, 
accepting that they may not be the "best" 
Contractor responses include: 
-Escalating problems to senior management 
-Timeliness is required for debriefing, written questions 
prior to debriefing and a teaming approach with the 
customer 
Analysis: Contractors could improve the debriefing process by 
sending written questions in advance of the debriefing, and by 
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attending the debriefing for the purpose of learning, not for 
the purpose of having their unsuccessful proposal 
reconsidered. Also, contractors should not ask questions they 
know the contracting officer cannot answer, such as "how did 
the awardee arrive at that price?". Contracting officers are 
fearful of protests since they are so easy to file. 
Contractors had very few comments. This could indicate that 
they feel it is up to the Government to improve the debriefing 
process, not unsuccessful offerors. 
C.  INTERVIEWS 
Personal interviews were conducted with two of the 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, personnel who are 
responsible for Procurement Management Reviews (PMRs) of Army 
installation directorates of contracting. They were asked 
about systemic problems concerning the post-award debriefing 
at  the  installations  and  about  recommendations  for 
improvement. 
The systemic problems identified were basically not 
knowing what to talk about during the debriefing and not 
knowing how much to reveal to the unsuccessful offeror. Their 
recommendations for improvement were: 1) Training, whether it 
be formal or in-house, possibly by the Government 
attorney/advisor;  2) do the debriefing before any of the 
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principal evaluators "go on vacation" after award of the 
contract - have everyone there; and 3) perhaps, a road show 
presented by MACOM authorities, like the one AMC conducts for 
their systems contracting personnel, teaching both contracting 
officers and technical evaluators how to debrief unsuccessful 
offerors.  (USACSA, 1995). 
Analysis: These comments confirm the responses of some of the 
contracting officers who said they, and their technical 
evaluators, needed training in the debriefing process. They 
also support the findings of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection 
Board in their special study, entitled "Workforce Quality and 
Federal Procurement: An Assessment," that state contracting 
personnel performance could be improved through training in 
analytical ability and the ability to write. (USMSPB, 1992, 
p. 12). Debriefers need to be able to analyze the 
requirements of the solicitation with the technical, legal and 
cost evaluations to understand the entire process, and thus, 
be able to properly debrief unsuccessful offerors. If the 
significant weaknesses of the unsuccessful offeror are 
conveyed, in writing, to him with the notice of contract award 
information, there may well be no need for a formal post-award 
debriefing. 
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D. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The post-award debriefing process at the installation 
level is not broken, but neither is it working as well as it 
could and should be. With the improvements of FASA, and 
additional training of contracting officers and evaluation 
personnel, the process can be strengthened for the benefit of 
both the Government and unsuccessful offerors. It is 
important that all the key personnel involved in the 
solicitation and evaluation process be on hand to answer any 
questions, when legally possible, that the contractor may 
have. With more emphasis on the positive, we can give the 
contracting officer the ammunition for a positive rather than 
a negative outlook toward the debriefing process. The 
positive outlook will then spill over to the contractor. He 
will have a positive feeling that the Government treated him 
fairly and valued his proposal. Most importantly, the 
contractor will feel he has a better chance of winning future 
contract awards, because he found out exactly where he went 
wrong on this proposal. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented and analyzed the data obtained from 
the questionnaires and interviews with Department of the Army 
personnel. The research showed that although post-award 
debriefings are relatively timely, they do not always provide 
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the information unsuccessful offerors are seeking. Some 
contractors will protest for the sole reason of obtaining 
additional information. The research also showed that FASA 
will probably help improve the process, but that the 
debriefing process can be further improved. Chapter V will 
present conclusions and recommendations to improve the 
debriefing process, provide answers to the research questions 
and make recommendations for further research. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERAL 
In addition to presenting the conclusions and 
recommendations resulting from the data on the current 
debriefing process obtained and analyzed in Chapter IV, this 
chapter will answer the research questions and address areas 
for further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
There are three conclusions that can be extracted from the 
results of the research. 
1. The current debriefing process is not working as well 
as it should. 
The research shows that installation contracting 
officers feel they are providing as much information during 
the post-award debrief of unsuccessful offerors as the 
regulations allow. However, contractors indicate that the 
information provided is not always of value to them. 
Contractors often protest to gain more information that is 
usually made available during the discovery phase of the 
protest. 
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The format of debrief ings and the amount of 
information provided during the debriefing varies, not only 
from command to command, but also from contracting officer to 
contracting officer at the same installation. The quality of 
the debriefing mostly depends on the individual initiative of 
local personnel such as the contracting officer, the 
evaluation committee or the local commander. 
Whereas the current debriefing process is working, the 
research shows that respondents feel that it is not working as 
well as it could and improvements should be made to the 
debriefing process. 
2. FASA should help improve the post-award debrief. 
FASA specifically provides for the release of more 
information to the unsuccessful offeror during the post-award 
debrief. It also stipulates timely requirements for notice of 
award of contracts, contractor requests for debriefing and 
presentation of the debrief. Under the time constraints, the 
debriefing should occur before the time allowed for protest of 
the award. If the concerns of the unsuccessful offeror are 
addressed during the debrief, there should be less inclination 
to file a protest for the sole purpose of obtaining additional 
information on the evaluation and award process. 
3. Further improvements beyond FASA are possible for the 
debriefing process. 
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The research shows that there are ways to improve the 
current debriefing process in addition to the changes in FASA. 
Most notably is the use of training materials such as videos 
and pamphlets similar to the ones recently produced by AMC. 
Also, if technical personnel are made available to assist in 
the debriefing, unsuccessful offerors will be able to obtain 
answers to questions in technical subject areas of which the 
contracting officer may not have knowledge. Contracting 
officers need to have analytical training in order to 
understand the process of combining the technical, cost, legal 
and past performance evaluations to determine the best value 
to the Government. This is especially important when the 
contracting officer is also the source selection authority. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research results, the following six 
recommendations are made: 
1. Make the post-award debrief an integral part of the 
process for key personnel in the evaluation process. 
Participation of the evaluation board members and 
other evaluators in the debriefing process will enhance the 
quality of the debriefing. These personnel must understand 
from the inception of the evaluation process that the post- 
award debriefing of unsuccessful offerors is an integral part 
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of the process. Contractor personnel will get more timely and 
complete answers to their technical questions which, in turn, 
will enhance the confidence that unsuccessful offerors have in 
the source selection process. Timely, more complete 
debriefings may also reduce the number of protests that are 
filed for the sole purpose of obtaining additional 
information. Contractors will likely be better assured that 
they received a fair evaluation and that the source selection 
decision was proper. 
2. Give weaknesses still prevalent at the end of the 
evaluation process, in writing, to unsuccessful offerors with 
notification of award. 
Providing this information to the unsuccessful offeror 
along with the notification of award information may well 
suffice to answer his questions concerning the award. If the 
written list of weaknesses does not answer all the questions 
a contractor has, the contractor will be better able to query 
the Government representative in the specific areas of concern 
remaining, perhaps allowing for a speedier, less hostile 
debriefing meeting. This will make the whole process run 
smoother since the contractor will know that the Government is 
willing to be forthcoming with information to assist the 
unsuccessful offeror in preparing a better proposal in the 
future. 
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3. Allow for the submission of further questions by 
unsuccessful offerors to the contracting office prior to the 
post-award debriefing. 
When contracting officers know what the areas of 
concern of the unsuccessful offerors are in advance of the 
debriefing, they can tailor the information provided to those 
concerns. Also, this will help to ensure that the right 
personnel are available at the debriefing to address those 
concerns. This will reduce the problem of having a question 
asked during the debriefing that cannot be answered, or 
answered adequately, by the Government personnel present. 
4. Release all information that the contractor would 
receive under protest discovery procedures, if requested. 
One of the main reasons a contractor will protest is 
to gain more information about the evaluation and award 
selection process. If the contractor can obtain additional 
information during the discovery phase of the protest process, 
there is no reason the contracting officer should not release 
the information during the post-award debriefing. Research 
has shown that unsuccessful offerors want this type of 
information because it is useful to them. If it is not 
provided during the post-award debriefing, contractors have 
clearly demonstrated that they are willing to protest in order 
to obtain it. 
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5. Provide analytical training for contracting officers. 
One of the recurring comments by contracting officers 
pertains to the need for training and more familiarity with 
the evaluation process. This was reiterated by Headquarters, 
Department of the Army personnel. To properly assess the 
various evaluation inputs from technical, cost, legal and 
other personnel, the contracting officer needs analytical 
training. Since contracting officers are responsible for the 
post-award debriefing, this will enhance their ability to 
present the pertinent facts to the unsuccessful offeror, thus 
assuring him that his offer was evaluated fairly, and 
providing information that will help him in future 
competitions. 
6. Use videos and other types of training on "how not to" 
and "how to" conduct a post-award debriefing. 
Use of a pamphlet and a video, such as the ones 
recently produced by AMC concerning "how not to" and "how to" 
conduct a post-award debrief, would also be of value to the 
installation contracting officer. 
D.  ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary. What are the systemic problems and issues 
associated with the Army Installation Contracting Offices' 
debriefing of unsuccessful offerors and what guidance can be 
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provided to the contracting officer in order to improve the 
debriefing? 
Systemic problems associated with the debriefing process 
include: debriefings not always being conducted in a timely 
manner; key evaluation personnel not available for the 
debriefing; contracting officers unfamiliar with the 
evaluation process; and resultant information given out in the 
debriefings not addressing unsuccessful offeror's concerns, 
which often leads to a costly protest for the sole purpose of 
obtaining additional information on the evaluation and award 
process. 
FASA provides some more guidance to contracting officers 
than was previously available. However, it is not all 
inclusive. Both contracting officers and technical evaluators 
would benefit from training on "how not to" and "how to" 
debrief unsuccessful offerors. This type of instruction is 
available through training aids such as the pamphlet, 
"Debriefing Handbook, A Practical Guide for Conducting Post- 
Award Debriefings," (Jan 1995) and video, "Debriefing 
Unsuccessful Offerors or A Practical Guide to those 'You lost, 
They won, That's it, Goodbye' Debriefings" (1995) recently 
produced by AMC concerning the post-award debriefing. 
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2.  Subsidiary. 
1) What are the current regulations, statutes, GAO 
decisions, and other guidance pertaining to the debriefing of 
unsuccessful offerors? 
The only readily available written guidance for 
installation contracting officers concerning the debriefing 
process is contained in the FAR. There are only a few 
installations which have internal operating instructions. The 
GAO has issued findings relative to post-award debriefings, as 
part of protest findings, but these are not readily available 
to contracting officers and require significant research to be 
of assistance. The requirements of FASA have not yet been 
implemented by the FAR; and even when they are, the debriefing 
process can still be improved beyond those requirements. 
2) What are the current requirements for debriefing 
unsuccessful offerors and how are the Army's Installation 
Contracting Offices conducting the debriefings? 
A debriefing is required only when the 
unsuccessful offeror makes a timely request after receiving 
notification of award of the resultant contract. Installation 
contracting offices follow the instructions of the FAR in 
conducting the post-award debriefings, and are not in 
agreement as to what information can or should be provided to 
the contractor.  The procedure and format of the debriefings 
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vary not only from command to command, but also from 
contracting officer to contracting officer at the same 
installation. If the debriefing is successful, it is usually 
due to the individual effort of local installation personnel. 
3) What are the problems associated with the 
debriefing process from the Installation Contracting Offices' 
perspective? 
Installation contracting officers identified 
several problems with the debriefing process. First, 
sometimes key source selection evaluators are not available to 
participate in the debriefing. Then only limited information 
is put out in the debriefing because contracting officers are 
not totally familiar with the evaluation process. They feel 
that more training is needed for both contracting officers and 
technical evaluators, in the "do's and don't's" of the 
debriefing process. Additionally, debriefings are not always 
timely. 
4) What are the problems associated with the 
debriefing process from the contractor's perspective? 
Contractors feel that debriefings are not always 
timely and usually do not provide enough detailed information 
as to the actual scoring of evaluation factors. Information 
is limited due to restrictions imposed by the regulations. 
When questions are asked about the awardee's proposal, little 
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or no information is provided.  Sometimes the key technical 
evaluators are not available for the debriefings. 
5) What guidance can be provided to the contracting 
officer in order to improve the debriefing of unsuccessful 
offerors? 
AMC has produced a pamphlet and a video concerning 
"how not to" and "how to" conduct a post-award debrief. These 
types of training devices would also be of value to 
installation contracting officers. Analytical training would 
be helpful in providing the ability to assess the requirements 
of the solicitation with the technical, cost and legal 
evaluations of the proposals. Also, training in the ability 
to write would help the contracting officer convey the results 
of the evaluations to the unsuccessful offeror, in writing, 
along with the award information, which may well negate the 
need for a formal debriefing. 
E.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
One area for further research could be to look at the 
effects of FASA on the debriefing process once it has been 
implemented by the FAR and is fully in force. Another area 
would be to research debriefings from the prime contractor's 
perspective, including any processes they may have for 
debriefing their unsuccessful subcontractors, to determine if 
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there is a commercial way of conducting debriefings that the 




QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FORSCOM AND TRADOC CONTRACTING OFFICERS 
1. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) requires 
the Government to debrief unsuccessful offerors within five 
days after receipt of written request. Currently, Debriefings 




c. more than 20 
2. Debriefings should be conducted within  calendar days 
after written request. 
3. FASA requires that agencies provide reasonable responses 
to unsuccessful offeror's questions regarding whether agency 
followed applicable laws, regulations and procedures in 
soliciting, evaluating and awarding the contract. Currently, 
I . 
a. do not allow questions 
b. allow and answer all questions 
c. allow and answer some questions 
4. If I do not answer some questions it is because . 
a. I cannot answer them due to regulations or 
confidential/proprietary business information 
b. I will not answer them due to a possible protest 
c. not applicable, I answer all questions 
5.  Debriefings normally consist of . 
a. limited information, because  
b. as much information as I can give in accordance 
with the regulations and confidential/proprietary 
business information 
6. FASA requires that debriefings address the unsuccessful 
offeror's significant weak or deficient factors. Currently, 
debriefings clearly identify weaknesses in the unsuccessful 





7. I debrief unsuccessful offerors on the merits of 




8. Unsuccessful Offerors are normally satisfied with the 
debriefing on the technical, management, and cost elements of 




9. My debriefings are to unsuccessful offerors in that 
upon conclusion of a debriefing, they completely understand 
why they did not win the contract award, and debriefings give 
them information that leads to more competitive proposals in 
future competition. 
a. valuable 
b. somewhat valuable 
c. not at all valuable 
10. Debriefings should address (indicate all that apply 
as long as confidential business information is not disclosed. 
a. the basic proposed technical solution of the 
awardee 
b. the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and 
debriefed offeror 
c. cost or price associated with the major 
components of the awardee's proposal 
d. overall ranking and total evaluation scores of 
the awardee and debriefed offeror 
e. technical point scores of the awardee and 
debriefed offeror 
f. all of the above 
g. other (specify)  
11. List 3 strengths of the Army debriefing process. 
l._ .  
2.  
3. —  
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14. I/The Army could improve the debriefing process by 
15. Unsuccessful offerors could improve the debriefing process 
by  
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FORSCOM AND TRADOC CONTRACTORS 
1. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) requires 
the Government to debrief unsuccessful offerors within five 
days after receipt of written request. Currently, Debriefings 




c. more than 20 
2 .  Debriefings should be conducted within  calendar days 
after written request. 
3. FASA requires that agencies provide reasonable responses 
to unsuccessful offeror's questions regarding whether agency 
followed applicable laws, regulations and procedures in 
soliciting, evaluating and awarding the contract. Currently, 
the Army . 
a. does not allow questions 
b. allows and answers all questions 
c. allows and answers some questions 
4. If the Army does not answer some of my questions it is 
because . 
a. they cannot answer them due to regulations or 
confidential/proprietary business information 
b. they will not answer them due to their concern 
for a protest 
c .  other  
5. Debriefings normally consist of . 
a. limited information, because  
b. as much information as the Army can give in 
accordance with the regulations and confidential/ 
proprietary business information 
6. FASA requires that debriefings address the unsuccessful 
offeror's significant weak or deficient factors. Currently, 





7. The Army debriefs me on the merits of my proposal. 




8. I am normally satisfied with the debriefing on the 




9. The debriefings are to my company in that upon 
conclusion of a debriefing, I completely understood why my 
company did not win the contract award, and debriefings 
normally give me information that leads to more competitive 
proposals in future Government competition. 
a. valuable 
b. somewhat valuable 
c. not at all valuable 
10. Debriefings   should  address   (indicate  all   that 
apply) , as long as confidential business information 
is not disclosed. 
a. the basic proposed technical solution of the 
awardee 
b. the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and 
debriefed offeror 
c. cost or price associated with the major 
components of the awardee's proposal 
d. overall ranking and total evaluation scores of 
the awardee and debriefed offeror 
e. technical point scores of the awardee and 
debriefed offeror 
f. all of the above 
g. other (specify)  





12. List 3 weaknesses of the Army debriefing process 
l.__ .  
2._ .  
3 .  
13. The 3 most common questions I ask during a debriefing are 
1.  
2._ .  
3.   
14. The Army could improve  the debriefing process by 
15. I/unsuccessful offerors could improve the debriefing 
process by .  
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